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Another Word on Child Care
Professors Schaffer and Berman have written a stimulating brief in
support of a deduction for child care expenses in computing federal
taxable income. But, in addition, by the range of considerations which
their article takes into account, it illustrates the difficulty in opting for
deductibility or nondeductibility on the basis of a rational consideration
of income tax policies. The difficulty derives primarily from the fact that
child care expenditures partake of both a personal (consumption) element
and a business (income earning) element.' To the extent it represents
the latter, it does not represent personal income appropriately subject to
tax; to the extent it represents the former, it does. 2
This problem affects many expenditures, ranging from travel and
entertainment to commuting expenses to the cost of professional school
education. A variety of considerations have entered into the determination
that a particular expenditure falls on one side of the line or on the other.3
But a pervasive theme has been the degree to which the expenditure generally is connected with business activity, as compared with its connection to personal gratification. 4 In the traditional sense, the connection
between child care expenditures and income producing activity simply
is not sufficiently compelling to require deduction under the general
"ordinary and necessary" trade or business expense rubric; accordingly,
the case law barred deductibility. 5 In making the legislative judgment
to alter this pattern, there must be some further justification supporting
deductibility.
Professors Schaffer and Berman believe they have found this justification in the need to achieve tax neutrality as between the housewife
(whose imputed income from services is excluded from gross income)
ISee Feld, Deductibility of Expenses for Child Care and Household Scrvices: Hew Seetion 214, 27 TAx L. REV. 415, 425-429 (1972) ; Bitther, A "Comprehensive Tax Base"
as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 925, 952-954 (1967).
2 For a recent thoughtful discussion of the concept of personal income in an income
tax see Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 RtAmv. L. REv. 309

(1972).
3 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-474, 1970-2 C.B. 34 (cost of acquiring and maintaining uniforms is deductible if required as a condition of employment and not of a type adapted
to general use); Reg. § 1.162-2(e) (commuting expenses are not deductible); and Reg.
§ 1.162-5(b) (2) (expenditures to meet minimum educational requirements for qualification in employment are not deductible).
4
See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); United States v. Gilmore, 372
U.S. 39 (1963); Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962); Henry C. Smith, 40
B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd without opinion, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940); Richard W.
Drake, 52 T.C. 842 (1969).
5 Henry C. Smith, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd without opinion, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1940) ; Mildred A. O'Connor, 6 T.C. 323 (1946); and cases cited in Feld, Deductibility
of Expenses for Child Care and Household Services: Yew Section 214, 27 TAX L. R V.
415, ns.13, 14 (1972). See the diseussion.in Keane, Federal Income Tax Treatment of
Child Care Expenses, 10 HARV. J. LEGIs. 1, 30-35 (1972).
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and the working mother (whose cash income will be subjected to tax) .
This tax difference may be substantial enough to affect conduct, as I have
suggested elsewhere, and therefore presents a serious problem. But the lack
of tax neutrality derives from the decision to exclude imputed income
from the tax base. The decision can be ascribed to the administrative
difficulty and perceived unfairness in assessing tax on noncash imputed
income. The difference between being paid for services and consuming
them oneself is a reasonable way to distinguish taxable from nontaxable
income, even though it necessarily will produce some inequity as between
taxpayers enjoying the same economic income. Any remedy should look
income of the housewife, not
to inclusion in income of imputed services
7
base.
tax
further exclusions from the
Moreover, the attempt to achieve equity of this sort through an exclusion or deduction affecting a particular kind of income frequently creates
new inequity. It is difficult to distinguish child care from the other kinds
of imputed services income which escape tax and for which a taxpayer
who uses his services to earn cash income may have to substitute the
nondeductible purchase of the services of another. Professors Schaffer and
Berman attempt to do so on the ground that when a taxpayer employs
another to mow his lawn, the expense is personal and not even partly business related. It is submitted, however, that such services may bear the
same "but for" relationship to earning income as child care expenditures:
But for the need to work, the expenditure would not be made because
the taxpayer would use his own services. The difference between the two
expenditures depends upon our perceptions as to the connection between
the expenditure and the process of producing income. Is child care different
from -the cost of cleaning house to a single wage earner?
By reason of the graduated income tax rates, deductions are more valuable for high income than for low income taxpayers. Thus, to the extent
that Professors Schaffer and Berman are wrong in their judgment that
child care expenditures are an income producing, rather than a personal, expenditure, they will have succeeded in redistributing income from
the poor to the rich. If we continue to eliminate higher income taxpayers from the benefits of the deduction by an adjusted gross income
ceiling as the current statute does, however, we perpetuate the tax
disincentive to mothers to work outside the home at precisely those
income levels where the disparity between cash income and imputed
income is likely to affect behavior.
"The search for precise equity among taxpayers" produces inordinate
o Schaffer & Berman, Two Cheers for the Ohild Care Deduction, 28 TAx L. Rnv.
HAv. L. REV. 309,
(1973). Andrews, Personal Deduction in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
a tax subsidy,
considered
be
not
(1972), suggests that a child care deduction should
with
compared
as
tasks
household
for
time
of
loss
it is justified by the mother's
nonworking mother.
7 Cf. Reg. § 1.119-1(e) (2).
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complexity in the law at best; 8 more likely, it states an unattainable goal.
Tax provisions dealing with great numbers of taxpayers which depend
for their soundness on generalized assumptions concerning the subjective
intentions and motivations of taxpayers are apt to produce either unduly
Draconian or unduly generous results in a great many cases. Perhaps the
dilemma in dealing with child care expenditures derives in part from
their being treated on an all or nothing basis as fully deductible or not.
Unlike courts, legislatures have the option to mitigate extreme results by
doing approximate and rough justice in most cases through arbitrary
rules and distinctions. Where the child care covers a time period during
which both spouses are at work and the child cannot be left unattended,
there is some element of business relatedness which may be thought
stronger and more certain than the purchase of other personal services
as a substitute for consuming one's own services. While this difference
is one of degree, it is one which might provide an appropriate basis for
granting tax recognition to the expenditure. This recognition need not
be full deductibility. Congress could give effect to the dual nature of
the child care expenditure in an arbitrary arithmetic fashion by allowing
a part of the expenditure as a deduction and disallowing the balance as
personal. Alternatively, Congress could give recognition to the added
costs of two spouses working and partially mitigate the disincentive to a
wife to work outside the home, without tying the tax benefit to a specific
expenditure, by excluding from income some portion of the earned
income of the second spouse where both spouses work. In doing either,
Congress might be giving fuller effect to the notion of taxable income as
"aggregate consumption. plus accumulation of real goods and
services
or claims thereto" 9 than by denying or granting the deduction in full
and taxing the income in full.
ALAN L. FELD
Boston University School of Law
8 Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the Subject of General
Tax Reform, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7008 (1973) (statement of Secretary Schultz).
9Andrews, Personal Deductions in an ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 318
"(1972).

